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I. INTRODUCTION 
As advocates, one of the most important duties of lawyers is to 
assist clients in identifying and securing their essential rights and 
responsibilities.1 As officers of the court, lawyers are called upon to 
assist in the administration of justice. As public citizens in a democratic 
society, one of the most important duties of lawyers is to improve the 
law and the legal system not only for the benefit of their clients but also 
for the benefit of society (“the public”).2 In a democracy, because 
improvements in the legal system generally require democratic support, 
the duty to improve the law includes a duty of public education 
regarding rights and responsibilities. In all three roles, lawyers are to act 
with competence3 and candor.4 An important category of rights and 
responsibilities in a market economy is the category of economic rights 
and responsibilities. Although legal scholars and law review editors are 
not, as such, client advocates, their opportunity to promote 
understanding and sow confusion carries with it an ethical responsibility 
to do the former and avoid the latter. Legal scholars who write on the 
confluence of law and economics share this responsibility. 
To formulate legal policy, legal competence requires a 
consideration of all materially relevant principles and insights, a 
willingness to question underlying assumptions, logical coherence, a 
prioritizing of issues commensurate with their legal importance, and the 
marshaling of replicable evidence that reveals whether theory and logic 
1. Robert Ashford, Socio-Economics: What Is Its Place in Law Practice?, 1997 WIS. L.
REV. 611, 615 (1997). 
2. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2016).
3. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2016).
4. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT rr. 3.3, 4.1 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2016).
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conform to reality. This Symposium Issue on Law and Socio-Economics 
is offered to show that employing a socio-economic approach as the 
foundational starting point for law-related economic analysis, rather than 
a so-called “law and economics” approach, better enables lawyers to act 
competently and candidly to assist clients and the public to identify and 
secure their essential economic rights and responsibilities by revealing 
important insights that are excluded from a law and economics analysis. 
In support of the foregoing proposition, this Symposium Issue 
presents nine Articles by ten authors (four of whom hold not only J.D. 
degrees but also Ph.D. degrees in economics). These Articles offer 
various socio-economic approaches to legal scholarship covering a wide 
range of important issues. Most of the Articles will be understandable to 
people with little or no prior understanding of economics. Several may 
prove more challenging, at least in part. The issues discussed include (1) 
the importance of values in economic analysis,5 (2) the important 
connection between the distribution of the opportunities for earning (an 
economic right) and the practical ability of people to exercise seemingly 
non-economic rights such as reproductive rights,6 (3) the beneficial 
socio-economic effect of (and irrational opposition to) the federal estate 
tax,7 (4) the important connection between economic ideology and 
systemic corporate crime and civil fraud,8 (5) anti-trust policy in light of 
socio-economic principles,9 (6) the harmful economic effects of 
homeschooling on the democratic right to and necessity for public 
education,10 (7) an explanation of the General Theory of Second Best—a 
theory widely acknowledged by economists, but largely ignored in the 
law and economics literature that undermines the assumption that legal 
rules and policies that seemingly enhance economic efficiency in 
particular contexts will enhance rather than worsen overall efficiency 
within an economy,11 (8) a rigorous socio-economic empirical analysis 
5. Hon. Guido Calabresi, Values and the Law: 2010 AALS Annual Meeting Luncheon
Keynote Address, 49 AKRON L. REV. 311 (2016). 
6. Terry O’Neill, What Does the Minimum Wage Have to Do with Reproductive Rights?, 49
AKRON L. REV. 319 (2016). 
7. Richard Gershon, The Socio-Economics of the Federal Estate Tax: Why Do So Many
People Hate (or Love) This Centenarian?, 49 AKRON L. REV. 329 (2016). 
8. William K. Black & June Carbone, Economic Ideology and the Rise of the Firm as a
Criminal Enterprise, 49 AKRON L. REV. 371 (2016). 
9. Jeffrey Harrison, A Socio-Economic Approach to Antitrust: Unpacking Competition,
Consumer Surplus, and Allocative Efficiency, 49 AKRON L. REV. 409 (2016). 
10. George Shepherd, Homeschooling’s Harms: Lessons from Economics, 49 AKRON L.
REV. 339 (2016). 
11. See infra Part XI. See also, Richard S. Markovits, The General Theory of Second Best
and Economic-Efficiency Analysis: The Theory, its Negative Corollaries, the Appropriate Response 
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showing inequality in family law,12 and (9) the explanation of a socio-
economic market means to substantially alleviate systemic poverty by 
identifying and securing for all people “the competitive right to acquire 
capital with the earnings of capital.”13 
As disparate as these subjects are, the Articles share common 
foundational principles needed to enhance the understanding of essential 
economic rights and responsibilities and to do justice to those subjects 
and society. First, competent law-related policy analysis in a broad array 
of contexts requires competent economic analysis. Second, competent 
economic analysis requires a consideration of all materially relevant 
principles and evidence drawn not only from the entire discipline of 
economics (not merely neoclassical economics) but also from disciplines 
other than economics. Finally, distribution is important to the socio-
economic analysis both normatively (in terms of values) and positively 
(in terms of facts). In general terms, this is the socio-economic approach 
to law-related economic analysis. A fuller articulation of socio-economic 
principles is set forth below. 
II. SOCIO-ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES
The term socio-economics has been used for over a century. Its use 
grew beginning in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, with 
emergence of economics in academia as a discipline distinct from its 
historical roots in the older “political economy.” The term socio-
economics has been employed with various meanings in disparate 
contexts. Usually, however, the varied meanings share an underlying 
conviction that the developing abstract principles of neoclassical 
economics (that dominate contemporary economics, economic ideology, 
politics and public discourse) cannot be separated in their effect from the 
more complicated reality of social context. 
However, before 1997, socio-economics did not exist within legal 
education as a specially defined field with a specifically defined 
methodology; and law-related economic analysis was almost exclusively 
dominated by the approach known as “law and economics,” which 
(contrary to the falsely implied breadth of its brand name) continues to 
to It, and a Coda on the Economic Efficiency of Reducing Poverty and Income/Wealth, 49 AKRON 
L. REV. 437 (2016); Robert Ashford, “The General Theory of Second Best”—An Overview, 49 
AKRON L. REV. 433 (2016) (providing an introduction to Professor Markovits’ Article in this 
Symposium).  
12. Margaret F. Brinig, Result Inequality in Family Law, 49 AKRON L. REV. 471 (2016).
13. Robert Ashford, Why Working But Poor? The Need for Inclusive Capitalism, 49 AKRON 
L. REV. 509 (2016). 
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be almost exclusively limited to “law and neoclassical economics.” 
Since then, a particular definition of socio-economics has gained broad 
support among law teachers in recent years as a useful statement of its 
methodological principles. Accordingly, in this Symposium, “socio-
economics” refers to the statement of principles set forth in the petition 
signed by over 120 law teachers from 50 American law schools that 
established the Section on Socio-Economics of the Association of 
American Law Schools (AALS). The statement reads as follows: 
Socio-economics begins with the assumption that economic behavior 
and phenomena are not wholly governed or described by any one 
analytical discipline, but are embedded in society, polity, culture, and 
nature. Drawing upon economics, sociology, political science, 
psychology, anthropology, biology and other social and natural 
sciences, philosophy, history, law, management, and other disciplines, 
socio-economics regards competitive behavior as a subset of human 
behavior within a societal and natural context that both enables and 
constrains competition and cooperation. Rather than assume that the 
individual pursuit of self-interest automatically or generally tends 
toward an optimal allocation of resources, socio-economics assumes 
that societal sources of order are necessary for people and markets to 
function efficiently. Rather than assume that people act only rationally, 
or that they pursue only self-interest, socio-economics seeks to 
advance a more encompassing interdisciplinary understanding of 
economic behavior open to the assumption that individual choices are 
shaped not only by notions of rationality but also by emotions, social 
bonds, beliefs, expectations, and a sense of morality. 
Socio-economics is both a positive and a normative science. It is 
dedicated to the empirical, reality testing approach to knowledge. It 
respects both inductive and deductive reasoning. But it also openly 
recognizes the policy relevance of teaching and research and seeks to 
be self-aware of its normative implications rather than maintaining the 
mantle of an exclusively positive science. Although it sees questions of 
value inextricably connected with individual and group economic 
choices, socio-economics does not entail a commitment to any one 
paradigm or ideological position, but is open to a range of thinking that 
treats economic behavior as involving the whole person and all facets 
of society within a continually evolving natural context. 
Unique among interdisciplinary approaches, however, socio-
economics recognizes the pervasive and powerful influence of the 
neoclassical paradigm on contemporary thought. Recognizing that 
people first adopt paradigms of thought and then perform their 
inductive, deductive, and empirical analyses, socio-economists seek to 
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examine the assumptions of the neoclassical paradigm, develop a 
rigorous understanding of its limitations, improve upon its application, 
and develop alternative, perhaps complementary, approaches that are 
predictive, exemplary, and morally sound.14 
III. SOCIO-ECONOMICS AND “LAW AND ECONOMICS” COMPARED
The approach followed by socio-economists stands in contrast to 
the dominant so-called “law and economics” approach to law-related 
economic analysis that is employed in much legal scholarship. The 
dominant law and economics approach usually restricts law-related 
economic analysis to neoclassical economics. Thus, when used to 
describe the dominant approach, the term “law and economics” can be a 
seriously misleading misnomer because it implies that neoclassical 
economics speaks for the entire discipline of economics when, in truth, it 
does not.15 This restriction is problematic because it excludes not only 
other schools of economic thought, but also important insights from 
other disciplines that have an important bearing both on the essential 
rights and responsibilities of people and on the just resolution of 
controversies among them. 
This is not to say that neoclassical principles are not an important 
part of socio-economic analysis. Quite to the contrary, neoclassical 
principles rigorously applied in an appropriate context with candid 
recognition of their limitations are an essential component of socio-
economic analysis.16 When properly applied, neoclassical principles 
supply essential insights in aid of socio-economic analysis; however, 
improper application must be identified and corrected to preserve the 
14. Society of Socio-Economists, Statement of Socio-Economic Principles,
http://events.r20.constantcontact.com/register/event?llr=fikx5dkab&oeidk=a07ebzo4e39db97fd6e 
(last visited May 19, 2016) (with minor amendments from the original). 
15. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.1 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2016). For an extensive
analysis of the misleading consequences and dubious ethics of passing of law and neoclassical 
economics as though it is law and economics, see Robert Ashford, Socio-Economics and 
Professional Responsibilities in Teaching Law-Related Economic Issues, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 133 
(2004) (Published in a Symposium edition entitled Teaching Law & Socioeconomics). One is left to 
wonder whether the modern law and economics approach would have been so effective in winning 
widespread acceptance if it had been properly labeled law and neoclassical economics. 
16. In an early AALS Section on Socio-Economics, a prominent participant noted that she
was a “card carrying member” of the Law and Society Organization and astutely asked what is the 
difference between the Law and Society approach and the socio-economic approach. The 
explanation given by this author was that one could be a member of Law and Society and advance 
scholarship in that tradition and yet never need to address the principles of neoclassical economics. 
In contrast, little if any socio-economic scholarship is published that does not address principles of 
neoclassical economics.  
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rigor and integrity of positive and normative legal analysis, to enable 
people to identify and secure their essential rights and responsibilities, 
and to avoid injustice. 
IV. ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING WEALTH-MAXIMIZING CLAIMS OF
LAW AND ECONOMICS 
An extremely important but problematic aspect of neoclassical 
economics is its faulty theory of aggregate, interpersonal, and individual 
wealth maximization. On the aggregate level, wealth maximization is 
colloquially referred to as maximizing the “size of the pie.” On the 
interpersonal level, wealth maximization refers to maximizing the 
benefits that people derive from their voluntary choices regarding 
mutual cooperation and exchange. On the individual level, it refers to 
benefits derived from freely determined individual choices. 
According to neoclassical economics, the aggregate size of the pie 
is maximized by the (“optimally”) “efficient” allocation of scarce 
resources.17 However, for this allocative form of wealth maximization to 
be “optimal,” a number of counter-factual conditions must be satisfied: 
(1) economic actors act individually and rationally, and are fully 
informed; (2) preferences, skills, and technology are constant; (3) there 
are no transactions costs; (4) all external costs are reflected in prices; (5) 
markets operate competitively, with no barriers to entry, and distribute 
income earned from production in accord with the value of the marginal 
productivity of the contributions to production; (6) positive and 
normative considerations regarding issues such as wealth distribution, 
race, gender, class, and nature can be ignored or encapsulated within the 
market; and (7) economies “gravitate” toward stable equilibrium rather 
than undergoing evolutionary and revolutionary change. 
Based on the false premise that the efficient allocation of resources 
is the primary, if not exclusive, mechanism of wealth maximization 
(discussed more fully in Part XIII below) and the factually dubious 
premise that the foregoing assumptions are even approximately accurate, 
the dominant law and neoclassical economics approach considers that 
these assumptions and their implications are the best foundational 
starting point for law-related economic analysis. This assumption places 
on those who disagree with this starting point the burden of establishing 
(based on some unarticulated standard of proof or persuasion) some 
better starting point. In contrast—and in harmony with legal reasoning—
17. Resources are scarce in economic terms either because more are desired by people than
are available or because they are costlier to access than people can afford. 
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before accepting the neoclassical approach to economic analysis rather 
than other schools of economics as the preferred foundational starting 
point in a particular context, socio-economics requires sound basis for 
doing so. 
Some important implications flow from accepting the law and 
economics approach as the presumptively appropriate starting point for 
law-related economic analysis: (1) the economy operates at or near full 
capacity, (2) all unemployment (beyond transitions from one 
employment into another) is voluntary, and (3) any attempt that might 
aid people who are presently economically disadvantaged presumptively 
compromises aggregate wealth maximization and redistributes wealth.18 
In addition, there is a general assumption that wealth is maximized on 
the aggregate, interpersonal, and personal level by legal policy that 
minimizes both transactions costs and the substitution of government 
choice for private choice. As explained more fully below, consistent 
with principles of legal competence, the socio-economic approach 
questions every one of the foregoing assumptions, and many if not most 
socio-economists would go further to note that every one of these 
assumptions are contradicted both by casual observation and empirical 
measurement. 
V. MARKET EFFICIENCY, ADAM SMITH’S “INVISIBLE HAND,” AND THE 
ROLE OF LAW 
To whatever extent the foregoing conditions exist, they do so only 
with the aid of the law, including (1) property rights and liability rules, 
(2) the provision of public goods needed to maintain a more efficient 
market structure open to all (usually paid by taxes), (3) the required 
internalization of external costs not born by market participants to 
enhance efficiency, and (4) other government action needed if in reality 
a market system is to approach market efficiency. Thus, while 
recognizing that economic principles have an important bearing on the 
formulation and effects of legal policy, socio-economists observe that 
legal policy fundamentally affects how economic theory works in 
reality. Accordingly, whatever the processes of wealth maximization 
18. For example, the widely invoked standard of Pareto Optimality is a standard that assumes
an economy in which all wealth-enhancing voluntary transfers have occurred (i.e. an economy 
operating at full capacity). Conceptually, this leaves people who are excluded from effective access 
to opportunities unequally distributed to others in an assumed zero-sum game and therefore in a 
position in which any attempt to equalize opportunity must be justified as a taking from someone 
else. Such is the consequence of the so-called value-free, false assumption that a more equitable 
distribution of economic opportunity cannot yield a positive increase in the “the size of the pie.” 
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may be, the invisible hand of economics cannot fulfill its wealth-
enhancing promise alone but must work hand-in-hand with the visible 
hand of law. 
VI. VALUES AND EFFICIENCY
One quality of a competent lawyer is the ability to identify and 
bring to light what is not being talked about by those who would 
obscure, frustrate, and deny realization of essential rights. For example, 
the foregoing conditions widely advanced as the conditions assumed to 
be necessary for neoclassical wealth maximization make no reference to 
moral values. Surely such values are “goods.” But it is by no means 
clear that such values can be reduced to single variables and discretely 
priced in exchange for material goods priced in markets, nor is it clear 
that such goods are subject to the law of diminishing returns like other 
goods priced in the market. 
The Article entitled Values and the Law: 2010 AALS Annual 
Meeting Luncheon Keynote Address19 was written by Judge Guido 
Calabresi, Dean Emeritus of Yale Law School. Judge Calabresi is 
“unanimously recognized as a founding father of the Law and 
Economics movement, [whose] insights have become established as 
indispensable for understanding the rationale of legal rules.”20 A 
preeminent critic of the oversimplified misapplication of law and 
economics analysis in legal scholarship, Judge Calabresi discusses the 
pervasive importance of values in such scholarship.21 
There are those who, when advancing the law and (neoclassical) 
approach argue that it is “scientific” and “value-free” at least beyond the 
19. Calabresi, supra note 5.
20. Roger Van den Bergh, Introduction: The Impact of Guido Calabresi on Law and Law
and Economic 
Scholarship, 1 ERASMUS L. REV. 1 (2008). 
21. Included in his welcoming remarks to the 2008 Annual Meeting of the AALS Section on
Socio-Economics, entitled Adam Smith Was a Socio-Economist, Judge Calabresi, Co-Chair of the 
Section on Socio-Economics made the following observation: “When Robert Ashford first 
approached me with the prospect of serving as its co-chair during the tenth anniversary year of its 
existence, I noted that I had been a socio-economist long before he formulated the three-paragraph 
definition on which the Section was launched, and I am proud of that. Robert replied that the same 
could be said for Adam Smith. That is surely true. I believe Adam Smith would be pleased . . . 
pleased to see so many of you here to carry on the work of the Section. I have no doubt that the 
increasing acceptance of the socio-economic approach to law-related economic issues will enhance 
the development of legal education, practice and service . . . .” Hon. Guido Calabresi, Adam Smith 
Was a Socio-Economist, (Jan. 3, 2008), http://journaloflawandsocioeconomics.com/
GuidoCalabresiWelcomingRemarls080103.pdf. 
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value of efficiency.22 But accepting the initial distribution of wealth 
without a consideration of the values exercised, rewarded, and 
compromised in accumulating that wealth and the rights of those 
affected by the accumulation, is itself a value judgment as is the 
judgment to segregate allocative efficiency from other values 
inextricably connected with it and to elevate allocative efficiency above 
other values not readily reflected in market prices and other contributors 
to economic growth. 
VII. THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH MATTERS BOTH NORMATIVELY
AND POSITIVELY 
The conditions assumed to be necessary for neoclassical wealth 
maximization make no reference to distribution of wealth other than the 
premise that it is distributed according to the marginal productivity of 
the contributions to production. Although, the advocates of law and 
neoclassical economics readily acknowledge that distribution has moral 
consequence (which they generally relegate to the political sphere for 
resolution), their analysis fails to disclose that distribution also has 
important positive consequence.23 Yet, it is elementary to neoclassical 
economics that just as prices determine distribution, so too does 
distribution determine prices. Thus, there is no single wealth-
maximizing, optimal allocation of resources independent of distribution, 
but rather many optimal allocations based on many alternative 
distributions of wealth.24 In a capitalist economy, contributions to 
production are made not only by labor but also by real capital. 
22. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
23. For example, Harvard Professor of Law and Economics Steven Shavell declares:
“[T]aking the effect of legal rules on distributional factors into account . . . would not alter our 
conclusions . . . [because] society has an income tax and transfer system that it can utilize to 
redistribute income.” Steven Shavell, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (Harvard 
University Press 2004). Similarly, Judge Posner states: “[T]he efficiency ethic takes the existing 
distribution of income and wealth and the underlying human qualities that generate that 
distribution as given, and within very broad limits (what limits?) is uncritical of the changes in that 
distribution that are brought about by efficient transactions between persons unequally endowed 
with the world’s tangible and intangible goods.” RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
LAW 241 (6th ed. 2003). 
24. Warren J. Samuels, Maximization of Wealth as Justice: An Essay on Posnerian Law and
Economics as Policy Analysis, 60 TEX. L. REV. 147, 153-54 (1981) (reviewing RICHARD A. 
POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981)) (“[T]here is no unique wealth maximizing result, 
only results specific to the rights structure that supports the existing distribution of wealth.”); 
WARREN J. SAMUELS & A. ALLAN SCHMID, LAW AND ECONOMICS: AN INSTITUTIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE 2 (1981) (“[T]he concept of efficiency as separate from distribution is false.”); A. 
Allan Schmid, Institutional Law and Economics, 1 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 33, 37 (1994). 
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Significantly, law and neoclassical economics takes the initial 
distribution of wealth (including capital) as a given without regard to 
how it was acquired, how it is concentrated, and the consequences of 
such concentration on the rights and opportunities of many other people 
to contribute to present and future production. 
Important issues raised by the distribution of earning opportunities 
related to reproductive rights and inheritance are considered respectively 
in (1) What Does the Minimum Wage Have to Do with Reproductive 
Rights?25 by Terry O’Neill, President of the National Organization for 
Women (NOW) and former Tulane University Professor of Law, and 
The Socio-Economics of the Federal Estate Tax: Why Do So Many 
People Hate (or Love) This Centenarian?26 by Professor Richard 
Gershon. Viewing the question of distribution globally, U.S. Supreme 
Court Justice William D. Brandeis said, “We can have democracy in this 
country or we can have great wealth concentrated in the hands of a few, 
but we can’t have both.”27 
VIII. THE OPPORTUNITY TO LEARN
Closely related to the opportunity to earn is the opportunity to learn. 
The founders of the United States of America risked their lives to 
establish a democracy (albeit imperfect) in an historical context in which 
no democracy had survived for more than a few centuries before 
morphing into a succession of undemocratic, despotic regimes. The 
founders believed that democracy would not long survive without 
widespread, private opportunity to acquire property and widespread 
opportunity for public education. They realized that the opportunity to 
learn is inseparable from the opportunity to be productive and the 
capacity for democratic self-governance. 
Based on a rarely questioned assumption (made without regard to 
the distribution of wealth) that quantity and quality are almost always 
enhanced by competition, advocates of the law and neoclassical 
economics approach advance free-market competition as support for 
vouchers, charter schools, and homeschooling based on the premise that 
such competition will enhance parental (consumer) choice and 
incentivize the improvement of public education. But such 
argumentation ignores important realities.  
25. O’Neill, supra note 6.
26. Gershon, supra note 7.
27. JOSEPH R. CONLIN, THE MORROW BOOK OF QUOTATIONS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 48
(William Morrow & Co., 1st ed. 1984). 
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In an Article entitled, Homeschooling’s Harms: Lessons from 
Economics,28 Professor of Law and Economics George Shepherd notes 
that public education is a public good that enjoys the benefit of positive 
network externalities. As such, it will attract insufficient private 
investment in light of the social benefits it provides and therefore 
requires public support to achieve those benefits. Permitting people to 
opt out of public schools can result in adverse selection and a prisoner’s 
dilemma that works to the advantage of the affluent and to the 
disadvantage of most others. Fortifying these theoretical points with 
empirical evidence, Professor Shepherd presents an economic analysis 
that reveals the troubling impact of home schooling on the quality of 
public education that should be of concern to anyone who values the 
importance of education to equal opportunity and democracy. 
IX. EFFICIENCY AND FINANCIAL FRAUD
The conditions assumed to be necessary for neoclassical wealth 
maximization make no explicit distinction between lawful behavior and 
fraud that gives rise to criminal or civil liability. Not all wealth 
maximization that results in measurably greater allocative efficiency is 
consistent with normative values reflected in criminal and civil law. The 
dynamics and social consequences of wealth maximization based on 
lawful behavior and financial fraud are not the same. The persistence of 
financial fraud undermines the assumed validity of the conditions 
assumed necessary for allocative efficiency because such financial fraud 
obstructs the efficient operation of markets in a number of ways 
including: (1) (anti)competitive advantages that benefit the defrauder, 
(2) imposition of costs not reflected in market prices, and (3) barriers 
that prevent market participants from being fully informed. 
Theoretically, law can require disclosure and prohibit various criminal 
and fraudulent activities, but enforcement only partially succeeds and 
experiences diminishing returns. The idea that there is an efficient level 
of crime and fraud is a fundamental oxymoron. The neoclassical 
prediction that reputational losses will control wrongdoing falls on the 
disbelieving ears of many aggrieved victims of fraud including, for 
example, employees of the now bankrupt Enron who lost their 
retirement plan assets on the reputational strength of financial audits of 
Arthur Andersen, the once premier global accounting firm. 
In an Article entitled, Economic Ideology and the Rise of the Firm 
28. Shepherd supra note 10.
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as a Criminal Enterprise,29 Professors Black and Carbone address this 
tension in the context of the firm—the institution, indispensably 
protected by law, that is used to produce most wealth in all major 
economies. The authors explain how the ideology of misapplied 
neoclassical principles as typically reflected in law and economics 
scholarship has served to narrow the beneficial scope of fiduciary duties, 
to shift fiduciary focus from the long-term, wealth-enhancing practice of 
corporations to short-termism, and to increase incentives to use the 
corporation as the weapon of choice for those who would prosper at 
expense of others. 
X. THE REALITY OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION AND SOME OF ITS 
IMPLICATIONS 
Contrary to the reality of crime, transactions costs, externalities 
reflecting costs not reflected in market prices, the essential need for 
public goods, market barriers to entry by would-be competitors, and the 
imperfections inherent in all human creation, neoclassical economics 
assumes the conditions necessary for markets to operate competitively or 
nearly competitively to distribute income earned from production in 
accord with the value of the marginal productivity of the contributions to 
production. Yet there is widely accepted economic authority that no 
major economy operates competitively.30 None operate without 
government protections for favored producer and labor markets, without 
oligopolies and regulatory barriers that restrict competition from new 
entrants, and without substantial spending and employment by 
governments that do not operate competitively within the economies 
their laws and practices maintain. None operate without crime, 
externalities, tax-supported public goods, transactions costs, and other 
competitive impediments. To their credit, both economics and law 
recognize this reality; and within this context of imperfect competition, 
antitrust laws were enacted to minimize anti-competitive behavior so as 
to maximize the benefits of competition. 
In an Article entitled A Socio-Economic Approach to Anti-Trust: 
29. Black & Carbone, supra note 8.
30. According to a widely accepted economic authority, “a large volume of work . . .
suggests that [the neoclassical assumption of] perfect competition corresponds to an extremely 
special, limiting case of a more general theory of markets” and that “no important market fully 
satisfies the conditions of perfect competition and that most would not appear even to come close.” 
3 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 837-38 (John Eatwell, et. al., 
eds., 1987). 
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Unpacking Competition, Consumer Surplus, and Allocative Efficiency,31 
Professor of Law and Economics Jeffrey Harrison offers a socio-
economic analysis that highlights deficiencies in the law and 
neoclassical economics analysis of competition and monopoly. These 
deficiencies are traceable to externalities, the distribution of income, 
values in fairness and justice not well reflected in prices, anti-
government political bias prevalent in Supreme Court decisions, and 
other factors that seemingly compromise values, social welfare, and 
benefits that competitive markets are supposed to provide. These 
deficiencies work to the advantage of those who (by reason of wealth 
and market position) operate more freely from competition and to the 
disadvantage of those more highly subject to it and to the disadvantage 
of many others. Exploring a conflict in fundamental assumptions 
regarding the nature of human beings that exists among disciplines, 
Professor Harrison discusses important anti-trust legal policy 
implications that emerge from contrasts between the limited profit-
maximizing conception of human beings based on the dominant 
approach of neoclassical economics and the more realistic understanding 
of the human psychology advanced by the widely accepted Maslow’s 
hierarchy of needs. 
XI. THE GENERAL THEORY OF SECOND BEST AND THE DUBIOUS
NEOCLASSICAL STRATEGY OF IMPROVING NEOCLASSICAL EFFICIENCY 
IN PARTICULAR CONTEXTS TO ENHANCE SOCIETAL EFFICIENCY 
In response to many of the considerations noted above, many 
proponents of law and neoclassical economics would likely say: “We 
know all of that and take it into account.” And surely some of the more 
sophisticated scholarship in law and economics do take these 
considerations into account and analyze and advance neoclassical 
refinements and solutions to address externalities, public goods, 
transactions costs, crime, monopolies, imperfect competition, 
institutions, technology, distributional issues, and other considerations 
not reflected in market prices. A major noteworthy advance in economic 
theory is behavioral economics, which reveals a much more robust, 
complicated, and nuanced understanding of human psychology than the 
standard profit-maximizing homo economicus assumed in much 
neoclassical economics. Thus rather than rationality, there is “bounded 
rationality”; rather than maximization, there is “satisfaction,” “prospect 
31. Harrison, supra note 9.
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theory,” and other motivating considerations such as fairness, altruism, 
and trust. As welcome as these improvements are, for several reasons, 
they fall far short of correcting the harmful impact of the widespread 
misapplication of neoclassical theory as the exclusive or primary market 
mechanism for promoting wealth maximization. One reason is revealed 
by the General Theory of Second Best, discussed in the paragraphs that 
follow. Another reason is discussed further below in Part XIII. 
Law and neoclassical economics scholarship frequently 
acknowledges one or more realities undermine the conditions necessary 
for what might be called “perfect” (or “first best”) wealth-maximizing 
allocative efficiency in particular contexts. One response however is to 
apply more nuanced neoclassical analysis to prescribe how law can be 
structured to provide incentives, protections, and default rules to 
approximate hypothetical bargaining to minimize these realities or their 
effect and thereby move particular imperfectly competitive relations 
closer to perfect competition and thereby provide a “second best” level 
of efficiency and wealth maximization in particular contexts. However, 
the scholarship that pursues this “second best” approach almost 
universally fails to disclose and address the General Theory of Second 
Best. This theory teaches that attempts to structure legal policy to 
produce greater market efficiencies in particular contexts are as likely to 
decrease aggregate economic efficiency in the entire economy as they 
are to increase aggregate economic efficiency. 
In an Article entitled The General Theory of Second Best and 
Economic-Efficiency Analysis: The Theory, its Negative Corollaries, the 
Appropriate Response to It, and a Coda on the Economic Efficiency of 
Reducing Poverty and Income/Wealth Inequality,32 Professor of Law and 
Economics Richard S. Markovits, an internationally recognized expert in 
this field, explains the General Theory of Second Best and offers an 
analytical approach for predicting whether a policy that would decrease 
or increase the number and magnitude of an economy’s economic 
imperfections to specified extents will thereby decrease or increase 
overall economic efficiency. However, the approach requires both a 
theoretical and an empirical component beyond the expertise of most 
legislators, regulators, judges, and policy decision makers. Without such 
an analysis, there will be no reason to believe that legal rules that reduce 
inefficiencies in particular contexts will be more likely to better society-
wide, efficient outcomes than to worsen such outcomes. Thus, without 
taking into account the General Theory of Second Best, the vast law and 
32. Markovits, supra note 11.
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neoclassical scholarship offered to analyze issues relating to legal policy 
and its effect on efficiency in the context of particular economic choices 
is scholarship based on an important, undisclosed premise that impedes 
people and their advocates in their attempts to identify and secure their 
essential economic rights. The article concludes with an important 
application of the proposed analytical approach that explains why, 
contrary to the claim of most economists that a trade-off must be made 
between equality and economic efficiency (i.e., the claim that 
redistributive attempts to increase equality will decrease efficiency), tax 
and redistribution policies that reduce poverty and inequality are likely 
to increase economic efficiency.  
XII. THE NEED FOR EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
The best of intentions guided by economic theory can have harmful 
legal consequences. The socio-economic importance of empirical 
evidence, when obtainable and relevant, is recognized and well-
presented in the Articles by all of the authors who have contributed to 
this Symposium Issue. 
However, the most comprehensive example of the benefit of socio-
economic empirical research is presented by Professor of Law and 
Economics Margaret Brinig in an Article entitled Result Inequality in 
Family Law.33 In this Article, based on data obtained from random 
samples of Arizona and Indiana child custody cases, Professor Brinig 
presents and analyzes the socio-economic impact of a legislated 
presumption of supposed benefits resulting from shared parental custody 
(an approach now followed in an increasing number of jurisdictions 
based on a number theoretical advantages).34 According to her analysis, 
the data suggest that the legal presumption “requiring equal parenting 
time for all couples leads to inequality based on income, marital status, 
race and ethnicity, and in instances of domestic violence.”35 
Accordingly, Professor Brinig concludes that contrary to theoretical 
conjecture, the shared parental custody legal presumption “in fact drives 
some of the least attractive aspects of the picture of family dissolution, 
and that replication into future generations suggests that some changes 
need to be made immediately.” Her Article demonstrates how carefully 
33. Brinig, supra note 12.
34. “Because both parents, at least in theory, win and because judges need not make difficult
binary custody determinations, shared parenting presumptions have been seen as vindicating 
parental rights, forcing parents to cooperate in the reconstituted family, and ensuring children the 
two-parent influence so many lack at parental dissolution.” Id. at 476-77. 
35. Id. at 474.
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constructed and executed empirical analysis based on socio-economic 
principles can be decisive in formulating policy related to law and 
economics needed to enhance the prospects of achieving greater equality 
not only in family law but in all areas of the law. 
XIII. THE WEALTH-MAXIMIZING TECHNOLOGICAL ELEPHANT IN THE
LAW AND NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS ROOM: TECHNOLOGY AND THE 
DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS AS A MAJOR CAUSE OF WEALTH 
MAXIMIZATION 
As noted above, two of the most important intellectual tasks that 
lawyers need to do to help people identify and secure their essential 
rights and responsibilities are (1) to identify what adversaries are not 
talking about and (2) to address those topics according to their 
importance. One immensely important reality that law and neoclassical 
economics rarely discusses is the causal effect that advancing 
technology and the distribution of its ownership has on wealth 
maximization. 
Directly related to this failure, one of the most serious and 
pervasive, but least recognized, false impressions resulting from passing 
off neoclassical economics for the broader discipline of economics is the 
widespread confusion that results from treating the theory of 
neoclassical efficiency (which assumes constant technology) as though it 
were synonymous with a comprehensive theory of societal wealth 
maximization or growth (which is achieved largely by reason of 
advancing technology). 
In advancing his neoclassical approach to the analysis of law, for 
example, Judge Posner states, “What Adam Smith referred to as a 
nation’s wealth, what this book refers to as efficiency, and what a 
layman might call the size of the pie, has always been an important 
social value . . . .”36 Judge Posner compounds his error by declaring that 
the connection between efficiency and growth is “rather 
36. POSNER, supra note 22, at 252. Judge Posner offers no theory for the relationship between
economic principles and wealth-maximization growth other than those neoclassical principles 
based on allocative efficiency. In many contexts, Judge Posner equates efficiency with wealth-
maximization. For example, in discussing the moral content of the common law, Judge Posner 
declares, “Efficiency or wealth maximization is an important thread in the ethical tapestry [of the 
common law], but it is not the only one.” Id. at 265. Another example of falsely advancing the 
maximization of efficiency with total wealth maximization is evident from the following: “[W]hat is 
socially optimal under any measure of social welfare is for the net amount of pie produced to be 
as large as possible—this is efficiency—and then for the pie to be sliced up and distributed in a 
way that is best according to the particular measure of social welfare under consideration.” HOWELL 
E. JACKSON ET AL., ANALYTICAL METHODS FOR LAWYERS 351 (2d ed. 2011). 
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uncontroversial.”37 
As a matter of both political reality and positive economics, 
however, Judge Posner is wrong. Politically, his proposition is highly 
controversial. It has divided people for several centuries into polarized 
controversies between people on the left- and right-wing of politics. As a 
matter of economics, efficiency and growth are quite distinct concepts. 
Microeconomic efficiency (the primary focus of neoclassical economics) 
is not a general theory of growth or wealth maximization (the primary 
focus of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations). In a shrinking economy, 
every transaction might be neoclassically efficient. Moreover, 
neoclassical efficiency, even when positively related to growth and 
wealth maximization, is only one component of a much more 
complicated dynamic process that requires a recognition that technology 
and skills are not constant but constantly changing in immensely 
important ways. 
To better enable people to identify and secure their essential rights 
and responsibilities, Adam Smith was rightly morally concerned that 
people develop a deeper understanding of national per-capita economic 
growth because such growth produces the material basis (at least in 
theory, if distributional issues can be resolved) for providing a rising 
material standard of living for all people within the economy. 
If one takes an extremely long-run view, anthropoids like gorillas, 
monkeys, bonobos, and orangutans are not remarkably more productive 
per-capita today than they were fifty thousand years ago. On Earth, only 
humans are. 
What best explains the increase in per-capita growth in human 
production? In his pre-industrial era world-view, Adam Smith believed 
that it was labor specialization. In the modern post-industrial era, the 
focus has shifted to productivity. With neoclassical economics, the focus 
is on productivity at the margin or marginal productivity. As between 
these ways of understanding per-capita growth, the modern neoclassical 
focus on marginal productivity is superior because very little labor 
specialization can occur without the real capital (e.g. tools, machines, 
and structures) needed for most labor specialization. Shoe makers cannot 
make shoes without shoe-making tools; and farmers cannot farm without 
farm tools, animals, and vegetation. And the value of the tools, animals, 
and vegetation must somehow be accounted for in terms of their 
contributions to production if increased efficiency and growth are 
desired to be achieved via market transactions. But conceiving gains in 
37. POSNER, supra note 22, at 253.
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per-capita growth in terms of increases in labor specialization or 
productivity (even if those gains can be measured empirically) does not 
establish either conception as the cause of the growth. 
Likewise, although the substantial per-capita growth in the United 
States that has occurred since Adam Smith wrote can be characterized 
by the efficient allocation resources just as it can be characterized by 
labor specialization and increasing human productivity, that 
characterization does not establish allocative efficiency as the primary 
cause of the per-capita growth. In reality, despite over two centuries 
since Adam Smith published his inquiry into the cause of the economic 
growth of nations, the discipline of economics has yet to arrive at a 
single, coherent, widely agreed-upon, non-controversial, causal theory of 
per-capita growth. 
Observing modern day human behavior from outer space, the 
observer might conclude that umbrellas cause rain. Based on pre-
conceived assumptions, what may appear to be a cause may be only a 
residual effect. The lesson here is that although empirical evidence is 
essential for both good socio-economics and competent lawyering, the 
perception and interpretation of facts are often dependent on 
preconceived rules for determining them, which in turn depends on 
foundational assumptions. 38 At their epistemological foundation, both 
socio-economics and the adversary system assume that there is always 
another way of looking at things. 
Another way of understanding the cause of per-capita growth is of 
course to focus on the advancing technology (a four syllable word for 
knowledge) reflected both in the skills of people and also in the structure 
of the things they employ in production. Although exactly how it 
happens remains a scientific mystery, people readily accept the idea that 
knowledge can be somehow embedded in human brains in ways that 
enhance skills and thereby make people more productive. However, 
there is less widely-shared appreciation of how knowledge can also be 
embedded in things in ways that make them more productive. Consider, 
for example the productive capacity of a washing machine. It can do 
work as surely as people washing clothes by hand do work. Next 
38. See Thomas Kuhn, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION (2d ed. 1970). Thus,
although empirical evidence is always important to lawyers and socio-economists, it is not always 
decisive in determining causation in the real world. Empirically, the time of the sunrise can be 
predicted on September 10, 2043; but the perception of a sunrise is an illusion based on the false 
assumption that the sun orbits the Earth. It was only after the truth of a spinning Earth orbiting the 
Sun was understood that the foundation could be laid for the causal explanations provided by 
Newton’s Laws (the foundation of modern science) for the motion for all bodies from atoms to stars 
traveling at speeds not approaching the speed of light.  
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consider its capacity to do work if it is melted down to a blob of metal, 
plastic, and rubber. It has the same molecules, but it no longer has the 
productive capacity to wash clothes because the knowledge imbedded in 
its former structure has been destroyed. 
Property rights in things distribute income earned from their 
productive capacity as surely as the right to employment in 
nondiscriminatory environment. Thus, free individuals can earn from the 
accumulation of knowledge by way of (1) their increased labor skills, (2) 
working with more productive things (even though no more, and often 
less, labor skill is needed to employ them), and (3) property rights in the 
things employed in production even though the owner does none of the 
labor (if any) needed to employ them. Yet according to neoclassical 
economics, the distribution of productive capacity via property rights is 
viewed as only an effect but not a cause, of per-capita growth. Such a 
view obscures the importance of the distribution of property rights and 
cannot help but to confuse people rather than to enlighten them in their 
attempts to identify their essential economic rights and responsibilities in 
society. 
Since the dawn of the industrial revolution, technology has brought 
forth vast increases in per-capita productive capacity that are not 
primarily the result of the gains promised by allocative efficiency 
resulting from increased marginal productivity. For example, consider 
the great per-capita gains in wealth experienced in the United States 
beginning in the 1850s. These great gains are not continuous increments 
driven by marginal prices with causes rooted in constant technology and 
short time frames (which are the domain of neoclassical economics). 
Rather, these gains are discontinuous, sometimes explosively large 
changes in productive capacity and in the distribution of productive 
capacity and demand with causes rooted in technological progress, real 
capital investment, and the distribution of property rights subject to 
limited competition and aided by government definition, regulation, and 
the protection of property rights. 
In this context, consider the wealth-enhancing contribution of major 
corporations to the economies of the world. By legally defined, default 
rules, these corporations are endowed by law with a bundle of property 
rights essential to their wealth-enhancing power that in their essential 
entirety could not be privately negotiated (including limited liability, 
centralized management, primary claim on corporate revenues, and 
stable, perpetual, independent existence and capacity to contract legally 
unaffected by changes in the ownership of corporate shares). 
Corporations are financial infrastructure as surely as roads and canals are 
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physical infrastructure. Both channel and facilitate the opportunity to be 
productive. These legally protected corporate property rights enable 
corporations to produce goods and services and to distribute income on a 
scale far beyond the capacity of individuals whether acting alone or in 
cooperation with others. And although personal ability, ambition, labor, 
and luck play a prominent role, access to this wealth-enhancing, super-
human, legal infrastructure is also substantially influenced by the 
distribution of wealth. 
These major corporations flourish or fail in the surplus generated 
long before market prices of their factor inputs and products approach 
perfectly efficient equilibria. In this context, corporate wealth 
maximization requires maximizing both (1) “normal profits” (those 
earned in perfectly competitive markets) and (2) “economic profits” 
(those earned in the context of substantial technological advances and 
other conditions of imperfect competition). The major contributions to 
economic growth observed in market economies experiencing 
substantial growth—and achieved by corporations earning economic 
profits—occur when relevant markets are far from achieving perfect 
efficiency, when prices are far from the theoretical equilibrium, and 
when any growth effects resulting from market prices taken as signals 
that reveal relatively efficient resource allocation may be comparatively 
low or even negative. This is not to say that efficiency is not an 
important consideration in wealth-maximizing analysis, but it does not 
play the exclusive or primary, unambiguous, causal role in wealth 
maximization that neoclassical law and economics ascribes to it. 
There seems little doubt that the employment of an additional unit 
of capital or an additional unit of labor to produce something in an 
economy at equilibrium according to an accurate assessment of the 
relative marginal productivity of each unit will result in a maximization 
of wealth if that decision is viewed in isolation and all other 
considerations are held constant. However, to characterize the great per-
capital growth beginning with the industrial revolution and continuing 
until the present day as a phenomenon caused by the efficient allocation 
of resources is to conclude that the efficient tail is wagging the 
technological elephant. 
Some people who advocate neoclassical economics as the only 
proper approach to economics or the most appropriate starting point for 
law-related economic analysis would like people to believe that our 
nation’s founders saw a strong, principled, conceptual connection 
between the laissez faire, invisible-hand, market principles advanced in 
Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations and the democratic principles 
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advanced in the Declaration of Independence (published in the same 
year). However, history reveals that most of the founders were more 
interested in replacing the British hand of King George not with the 
invisible hand of Adam Smith, but rather with the American hand that 
included a good measure of protectionism for America’s fledgling 
industries. In fact, Thomas Jefferson harbored a widely and deeply held 
conviction that wide-spread access to property ownership is an essential 
requisite for individual wide-spread economic well-being and 
sustainable democracy. As an inventory of the libraries of the founders 
of Colonial America would reveal, the economic principles that 
influenced the founders are more likely found in the property analysis in 
John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government than in Smith’s Wealth of 
Nations.39 
It would probably surprise most of our founders that the 
distribution of property rights in “things employed in production” (i.e., 
“real capital”) is not fundamentally important to the wealth-maximizing 
promise of the economic theory that presently dominates economic 
analysis in the study of law.40 They would probably be more comfortable 
with the socio-economic approach. According to neoclassical analysis, 
the fact of ownership is indirectly important based on the assumption 
that people who own things are more likely to be motivated to allocate 
the employment of such things to more productive uses than people who 
do not own them but merely use them to do work. But researchers of 
legal scholarship would be hard pressed to find any law and neoclassical 
economics literature that expresses the view that wealth maximization 
might be greater if capital acquisition and income were more broadly 
distributed via market transactions. 
In Why Working But Poor: The Need for Inclusive Capitalism,41 
Professor Robert Ashford offers a wealth-maximizing theory of per-
capita growth that focuses on advancing technology, the productiveness 
of real capital, and the distribution of its acquisition. According to this 
theory, a broader distribution of capital acquisition with the earnings of 
capital not only enhances the earning capacity of poor and middle-class 
people but also promotes more per-capita growth than a narrower 
distribution. Based on that theory, he presents an analysis that suggests 
that the most important economic right that poor and middle class people 
need (but do not know they need) is “the competitive right to acquire 
39. Robert Ashford, Economics, Democracy, and the Distribution of Capital Ownership, 40
FORUM FOR SOCIAL-ECONOMICS 361 (2011). 
40. Id.
41. Ashford, supra note 13.
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capital with the earnings of capital.”42 Building on this analysis, the 
Article suggests that the most important, untried market strategy to 
reduce poverty and to achieve wealth maximization on the aggregate, 
interpersonal, and individual level is one that seeks to broaden capital 
acquisition with the earnings of capital by opening the system of 
corporate finance to all people so as to democratize the competitive right 
to acquire capital with the earnings of capital and thereby to establish an 
inclusive capitalist economy. 
According to Professor Ashford, structured to operate via voluntary 
transactions and without redistribution, the inclusive capitalist economy 
could substantially enhance the earning capacity of poor and middle 
class people by supplementing their labor income and transfer payments 
with capital income, reduce unemployment, raise wages, enhance 
working conditions, reduce taxes and tax rates, and promote sustainable 
economic growth. The Article then urges legal scholars, lawyers, law 
schools, law school clinics, and advocates for poor people to learn, 
teach, and advocate enhanced understanding of the importance to poor 
and middle class of securing for them the competitive right to acquire 
capital with the earnings of capital. 
XIV. CONCLUSION
By advancing and demonstrating the enhanced economic 
understanding that results from employing the socio-economic approach 
to law-related economic issues rather than an approach limited entirely 
or primarily to neoclassical principles, the Articles in this Symposium 
Issue of the Akron Law Review provide an important contribution to 
legal scholarship by better enabling people to identify and secure their 
essential economic rights and responsibilities in a market economy. I am 
grateful for the excellent assistance of the editorial team and staff of the 
Akron Law Review, faculty members of the University of Akron Blake 
McDowell Law Center, especially Professor Stefan Padfield, and the 
contributing authors in bringing this project to fruition and express my 
hope that other publications and scholars will continue the important 
work of advancing the principles of socio-economics in legal education 
and higher education. 
42. Id. at 534.
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